Franchising

Why?
Maybe managerial training
  Burger Colleges
But this should end like the CU golf course management group

Most likely explanations:
  1. Gains from brand names
     Why are brand names valuable?¹
  2. Significant amount of on-site production at dispersed locations
     On-going, indefinite horizon association between an outlet and a central agent

Organizational Spectrum
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Standard Story
Franchise – Minimizes on-site shirking / Maximizes on-site manager control
  Expand and enhance brand name
    e.g.: Coca-Cola internationally (franchise bottlers)
Creates opportunistic incentive to under-produce quality
  Quality reductions by one franchisee are partly offset by the quality expectations generated by other franchise units.
Franchisor must monitor franchise.
Franchise is worried about franchisor opportunism.
Contractual Features:
  Termination | Tie-In Sales | Royalties

Termination
Franchisee forfeits bond of lump-sum origination fee / forfeits building (land usually leased from franchisor) / funny looking building
Queue of potential franchisees
  Share of wealth — termination forfeits free cash flow — Kaufman-Lafontaine value of McD's
  Reduces the threat of opportunistic behavior by franchisor²
  Gives some local monopoly power – Implies that franchisor should set max prices and min store hours

¹ There is always great debate about whether information is valuable and about whether consumers are duped into consumption patterns. For the most part, I dismiss this view of the world. However, there is no incontrovertible evidence that brand names are valuable because of information.
² It would seem that a problem is created when franchisees buy their right from an existing franchisee and pay the full value of the franchise. These repurchased franchisees won’t make excess profits or at least not as much as does the original owner. However, the potential for franchisor opportunistic behavior has still been erased.
Tie-in Sales
Quality Control
Pricing — higher the price, the more incentive to obtain supplies from low-cost/low-quality agents
Use as royalty mechanism
   Raises the question of differential royalties

Royalties
Percent of sales — incentive alignment between franchisor and all franchisees
Maybe linked to costs incurred by the franchisor, e.g., advertising
   Usually there are separate royalties for net cash flow from franchisee to franchisor and advertisement funds

Empirical Issues
1. Royalty lump sum is not just two-part tariff
2. Outlets with larger non-repeat → company owned
   Outlets far from home office → franchised
3. Company owned stores function as training grounds for franchisor management and for testing grounds for new products
4. Tip the scales to company owned
   a. Capital
   b. Control by central office
   c. Variance in profitability

Brand Names

The Theory

The basic economic theory of brand names is that they are a goodwill asset on which the firm earns a profit. This profit shows up as a price premium for brand named products compared to their generic counterparts.

The function of the price premium is to induce the firm to maintain an expected quality level. The firm earns the price premium so long as there is no quality shortfall. The dimensions of quality are hard to identify or measure. But that is precisely why brand names are valuable. If quality was easy to measure then explicit contracts could be employed.

The magnitude of the price premium has several facets. First, in order to stop the firm from reducing quality, the price premium has to be large enough so that its present discounted value is greater than the cost savings from producing lower quality. If the firm sells low quality to consumers expecting high quality, a one time, windfall is received. The price premium must
be large enough to stop the firm from this type of behavior. Second, the price premium in present value terms has to be as large as the cost imposed on consumers from receiving low quality when they were expecting high. (This is a kind of symmetry result, which is not required by the theory, but is probably true.) Finally, the price premium has to be large enough to pay the normal rate of return on the investments made to create the brand name capital. Usually these investments come in the form of advertising expenses. Sometimes they are research and development. It may also be the case that a brand name develops as a free by-product of other business decisions. However, if a brand name is damaged, advertising is the normal way for the firm to attempt to revitalize it.

This theory of brand names suggests that expenditure on advertising is a bond between consumers and firms. The advertising is a non-salvageable investment that only pays for itself if the firm continues to produce a consistent, expected level of quality. By this argument, advertising need not have content. It is only necessary to demonstrate that a given level of investment is sunk into the brand name. Taking the argument close to the absurd, firms could simply burn money.

Some Evidence

There have been several studies that offer insight into the brand name problem.6

1. Peltzman and Jarrell -- These researchers examined product recalls in the auto and drug industries. They looked at the stock price reaction to the announcement of the recall. This is a measure of the cost of the recall to the firm. They then accumulated evidence on the out-of-pocket cost of the recall. Their finding was that the out-of-pocket costs were much smaller than the stock price decline. Hence, product recalls, which are assumed to be unexpected shortfalls in quality, have negative goodwill effects. This, however, does not mean that the goodwill decline is due to a decline in the price premium that the firm’s product commands in the market place. Recalls could cause goodwill losses among distributors, agents, and franchisees.

2. Mitchell, Tylenol -- This study examines the business fortunes of Johnson & Johnson during the period of the 1982 Tylenol poisonings. The finding is that J&J’s stock price took a big negative hit as a result of the terrorist tampering that killed 7. This negative investor reaction was in excess of the out-of-pocket costs of pulling the similar products off the market and replacing them with tamper-proof containers. Tylenol lost market share for a while, but J&J was able to regain the market-leader status of Tylenol by a vigorous advertising campaign. The cost of the advertising effort over the year following the disaster was approximately equal to the stock market losses suffered by J&J. We don’t know why consumers were reluctant to buy Tylenol

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after the poisonings, that is, we do not know if consumers treated the tampering as a shortfall in J&J’s quality. However, we do know that advertising of the sort predicted by the theory of brand names was required to restore Tylenol’s market share.

There is another issue in this story. It turns out that the industry cohorts suffered along with J&J, though not as much. This part of the story is not reported in the paper but it nonetheless true. This evidence reinforces the brand name story in some ways. To the extent that industry cohorts suffered it reflects the fact that while the cause of the problem was not due to J&J, it did represent a loss in the value of brand-named products overall. Consumers take brand named pills so that they can be confident of the quality: If the pain doesn’t go away, there is a more serious problem. Because of the poisoning episode, there was increased risk of taking such pills.

3. **Airplane Crashes** -- There have been numerous studies concerning the stock market reaction to air disasters. The general finding is that stock price falls about 2% net of market when a carrier crashes a plane. Mitchell and I did a couple of things that are interesting. We separated crashes into those that were arguably the fault of the airline, and those that were not. (Fault is not necessarily an issue: The Tylenol poisoning were not the fault of J&J.) In a random event like a airplane crash, the theory says that the company should suffer a goodwill loss when the event signals a decline in the expected level of quality. A crash, even due to pilot error, could be treated by consumers as just bad luck. “It had to happen eventually.” We found a bigger negative reaction to at-fault crashes. We found little or no reaction to not-at-fault crashes. Next we investigated insurance costs. We found that insurance rates reacted to at-fault crashes and not to not-at-fault one. Hence, we have consistent evidence that some crashes reflect an increase in the probability of danger (insurance rates increase) and these crashes are also associated with significant stock market losses for the carrier. Moreover, the stock market losses were larger than the insurance rate increases. We attributed this to the brand name loss.

4. **Coca Cola** -- The evidence cited in the previous studies implicitly argues that brand names earn a price premium that is at risk if the firm reduces quality. However, there is no explicit evidence of the price premium. In the Coke case such evidence is presented. In 1985, Coca Cola announced that they were changing the formula for Coke. The new product to be called Coca Cola was one that had been taste-tested extensively in unlabeled experiments. The new product was preferred by 60% of the tasters. Upon the announcement of New Coke, Coca Cola’s stock price plunged over 5%. The public outcry was overwhelming. Within three months, Coca Cola decided to bring the old formula back. Because of rules imposed by the Federal Trade Commission about the use of the word “new” in product labeling, the old formula was called Coca Cola Classic. At the announcement of Coke Classic, the firm’s stock price came back up about 2%. The evidence is marked: Coca Cola suffered a goodwill loss as a result of changing the formula. Mitchell and Benjamin go one step further. They examined the prices that Coke charged for the syrup to make the drinks. Their research reveals that the price premium enjoyed by Coke eroded as a consequence of the New Coke episode. Moreover, the price decline was approximately equal to the stock price decline. The interpretation is that consumers were paying for an assurance of quality consistency, and when that assurance was weakened consumers were not willing to pay as much.